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The focus of research about the relationship between the state and culture in 
Suharto-era Indonesia depends on the researcher's field of research. Political scientists 
who studied the New Order tended to use culture as an explanatory device for 
political behavior without considering the state's influence over culture or culture's use 
as a tool of governance.2 Researchers investigating other fields, such as anthropology,3 
the performing arts, and literature,4 demonstrated a strong understanding of the 
importance of the state-culture relationship. Within these fields, a small number of 
articles were particularly influential in shaping our understanding of Suharto-era 
cultural policy, providing a framework for later research. This research is important 
because it establishes a relationship between an arena of state activity (culture, 
narrowly defined by the state)5 and the assumptions and practices of Indonesians
1 The author thanks Krishna Sen for her guidance, comments, and feedback, and Curtin University for the 
opportunity to undertake and develop this research.
2 Simon Philpott, Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authority, and Identity (London: Macmillan, 2000). 
Ken Young's comments on political research in Southeast Asia also apply to Indonesia; see Ken Young, 
"Political Science and Southeast Asia: The Neglect of Gender," in Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian 
Politics, ed. Maila Stivens (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991).
3 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1993).
4 Barbara Hatley, "Cultural Expression," in Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics o f Socio-Cultural Change, ed. 
Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994); and Mary Zurbuchen, "Images of Culture and National 
Development in Indonesia: The Cockroach Opera," Asian Theatre Journal 7,2 (1990). Research into the media 
has also demonstrated an appreciation of the importance of the state in the construction of culture. Philip 
Kitley, Television, Nation, and Culture in Indonesia, Southeast Asia Series No. 104 (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Center for International Studies, 2000); Krishna Sen and David T. Hill, Media, Culture, and 
Politics in Indonesia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000).
5 In the next section I discuss the fields that fit into this definition and how they are organized.
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(culture, broadly defined as a way of life).b By examining the objectives and intended 
outcomes of national policy details and programs, cultural-policy research can be used 
to draw conclusions about how the state imagines and understands Indonesians. 
Researchers have used these findings to interpret state policies relative to a number of 
research topics concerned with culture—such as state regulation of customary 
practices, literature, the arts, popular culture, and the media, among others. The most 
influential articles on cultural policy are focused on the authoritarian, Suharto-era 
state, which raises the question of whether their approaches are still relevant in 
present-day Indonesia, with its freely elected parliament and significantly changed 
political system.
In this article, I take a narrow definition of cultural policy, addressing only those 
policies focused on activities that have been designated "cultural" by the Indonesian 
state, which I recognize as a heterogeneous institution with conflicting motivations and 
interests. I will examine how these policies were designed to influence the behavior of 
Indonesians. It will be necessary to consider broader social changes, in particular those 
caused by state policies, if they alter the context of cultural activities and trends (for 
instance, one might consider the way political decentralization has influenced 
individuals' inclination to participate in local rituals). Cultural-policy research 
therefore cannot only focus on policy-making, but should track the relationships 
among narrowly defined cultural policies established by the state, the practices of 
practitioners and audiences, the ambitions of policy makers to influence characteristics 
and behaviors, and the ways in which these policies have changed Indonesian 
"cultures," broadly defined as ways of life.
The purpose of this article is primarily to assess how cultural policy in Indonesia 
has changed since the resignation of Suharto (1998), and the degree to which an 
influential body of research on New Order era cultural policy is still relevant today. 
The first section addresses research that has analyzed the cultural-policy goals of the 
New Order state. It then focuses on three influential, widely referenced articles, 
published over a fifteen-year period by Greg Acciaioli, Keith Foulcher, and Philip 
Yampolsky,6 7 which capture perspectives from both anthropology (Acciaioli) and arts 
researchers (Foulcher),8 and provide accounts of the thrust and detail of policy.9 The 
first aim of this discussion is to link Suharto-era cultural-policy research to the broader
6 Tony Bennett, "Culture: Theory and Policy," Media Information Australia 53 (1989); and Raymond 
Williams, Culture (London: Fontana, 1981).
7 Greg Acciaioli, "Culture as Art: From Practice to Spectacle in Indonesia," Canberra Anthropology 8,1-2 
(1985): 148-72; Keith Foulcher, "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture; Patterns of 
Hegemony and Resistance," in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman (Melbourne: Centre of 
South East Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), pp. 301-20; and Philip Yampolsky, "Forces for 
Change in the Regional Performing Arts of Indonesia," Bijdragen Tot ed Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 151 4e 
(1995): 700-25. Acciaioli's article has 38 citations in "Web of Science," while Yampolsky's article has 24 
citations, and Foulcher's chapter has 10 (less in "Web of Science" because it is a book chapter), and 33 in 
"Google Scholar."
8 Yampolsky is an ethnomusicologist and could fit into either category. However, his recording work on 
regional music would most likely place him in the "arts research" category.
9 Other influential articles cover similar ground. See Hatley, "Cultural Expression"; Zurbuchen, "Images of 
Culture and National Development"; Amrih Widodo, "The Stages of the State: Arts of the People and the 
Rites of Hegemonization," RIM A 29 (1995); R. Anderson Sutton, "Performing Arts and Cultural Politics in 
South Sulawesi," Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 151,4 (1995); and Robert W Hefner, "The 
Politics of Popular Art: Tayuban Dance and Culture Change in East Java," Indonesia 43 (1987).
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field of cultural-policy research by examining the concept of "authoritarian" cultural 
policy. Connecting these ideas to broader cultural-policy approaches both provides a 
basis for hypothesizing about the characteristics of New Order cultural policy and 
assists in achieving the primary aim of this paper—to examine how cultural policy in 
Indonesia has changed since the fall of Suharto.
My intention is to provide a broad assessment of cultural policy change by drawing 
on events of both national and regional importance across Indonesia as a starting point 
for cultural-policy analysis of the Reformasi (post-Suharto) period. West Java receives 
the most attention, as it was one of my bases during an extended stay in Indonesia in 
2001. (The examples from West Java in each of the sections on non-national cultural 
policy indicate that diversity exists within jurisdictions as well as between them. I also 
conducted interviews and collected data during four subsequent visits between 2001 
and 2009, including visits to Padang, Pekan Baru, Makassar, Lombok, Bali, and 
Yogyakarta. While it is impossible to be comprehensive with this kind of approach, it 
suits the national scope of this paper, and supports the creation of a hypothesis that 
will be tested by future research.
Indonesian Cultural Policy under Suharto: The View from Indonesian Studies
Before turning to the three articles that defined New Order cultural policy, it is 
important to clarify the classifications that divide culture into workable chunks in 
Indonesia. The key division is between tradisional culture, which encompasses 
indigenous cultural practices that are generally linked to indigenous ethnic groups, 
and moderen culture, which refers to contemporary cultural forms originating from 
Indonesia and overseas that bridge regions and, often, nations. Many commentators10 1
prefer to use the respective terms regional (or, in some cases, local) and national or 
Indonesian in order to avoid the value judgments that might be implied by 
"traditional"/"modern" designations. However, in Indonesia the term national has 
been used to refer to patriotic pieces rather than genres. Following Yampolsky, I use 
the term regional to refer to cultural practices and knowledge linked by history, 
language, or culture to a particular region, and, often, ethnicity, and I use the term pan- 
Indonesian to refer to contemporary culture that relies on the national language and is 
perceived to be shared by all Indonesians."
Late Dutch colonial governance was an important driver of the construction of 
regional cultures in Indonesia, and the colonial state's designation of regional cultures 
became a spatial organizing principle that influenced the nation into the next century. 
Dutch administrators viewed their mission as guiding natural "organic" cultural 
processes towards their evolution and thus fostering the improvement of the 
indigenous populations.12 Indigenous Indonesians fared poorly within the cultural
10 Foulcher, "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture"; and Yampolsky, "Forces for Change."
11 It should be noted that ethnic culture that is not indigenous falls outside of this division, and is generally 
ignored in cultural policy. This has created difficulties in gaining cultural recognition for large migrant 
ethnic groups, in particular Indonesian-Chinese, who also had their culture suppressed by the state 
throughout the New Order era. See Charles Coppel, Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Singapore: 
Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 2002).
12 Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherland Indies, 1900-1942 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1995).
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taxonomy that supported the continuation of Dutch rule. They were categorized as 
lacking the capacities for full participation in colonial society and were not granted the 
rights of full citizenship. In addition to legitimizing colonial rule, the pluralism of the 
cultural categories also supported the "divide and rule" tactics of the Dutch state in the 
face of the threat of unified opposition from either nationalist or Islamic groups.13 The 
New Order state, like the Dutch, also marginalized Islamic political parties and was 
highly suspicious of Islamic groups.14 15John Pemberton's research indicates that the 
New Order state drew on the constructed tradition of the Javanese courts in order to 
legitimize itself by presenting its authority as cultural, and that it used ritual to 
represent Javanese society as inherently stable and ordered.13 In this scheme, organized 
Islamic groups were consigned to a marginal position because they potentially 
threatened the existing order. Pemberton's account of the changing use of practices 
deemed culturally Javanese demonstrates how state power has shaped and continues 
to shape Javanese tradition, ritual, and culture, during the colonial period, and then 
during the New Order period.
Pemberton's analysis of Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park (Taman Mini 
Indonesia Indah) reinforces his argument about the New Order's use of tradition. The 
New Order regime created Taman Mini as a state-sanctioned sacred representation of 
the nation, effacing both colonial pasts and violent New Order beginnings, and 
denying the authority of potential opposition movements, including those inspired by 
Islam.16 In the words of Shelley Errington, 'Taman Mini is not a 'model o f Indonesia, 
... but a 'model for' Indonesia,"17which explains why this monument is so often 
mentioned by scholars who study the use of culture by the New Order regime. 
Researchers often highlight the hierarchies that Taman Mini constructs to separate and 
categorize ethnic cultures. Representations of each ethnic group's culture become 
increasingly homogenous for those groups that reside at a distance from the "cultural 
center" of Java.18 Acciaioli argues:
[Taman Mini] constructs the generic Indonesian, and presents all the local variety 
of Indonesian cultures as regional variations, defined by administrative divisions 
in matters of detail, upon basic shared themes, the purported "local genius" or 
basic cultural substratum of Indonesianness. What diversity is evident is 
generated centrally, permitted embroidery upon an homogenised broadcloth
13 See Benedict R. O. Anderson, "The State and Minorities in Indonesia," in Southeast Asian Tribal Groups 
and Ethnic Minorities, ed. Ruth Taswell (New Haven, CT: Cultural Survival, 1987), pp. 73-81; Tom 
Boellstorff, "Ethnolocality," The Asia Pacific Journal o f Anthropology 3,1 (2002): 24—48; and Gouda, Dutch 
Culture Overseas. See also Vickers's account of the use of culture in the colonial construction of Bali as a 
paradise: Adrian Vickers, Bali: A Paradise Created (Melbourne: Penguin, 1989).
14 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000).
15 John Pemberton, On the Subject o f "Java" (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
16 Pemberton also notes the contradictions that assert themselves due to the conflation of time and 
construction of authenticity in Taman Mini, specifically, and the New Order's use of cultural authority 
more generally. John Pemberton, "Recollections from 'Beautiful Indonesia' (Somewhere Beyond the 
Postmodern)," Public Culture 6 (1994): 241-62.
17 Shelley Errington, The Death o f Authentic Primitive Art and Other Tales of Progress (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1998), p. 222.
18 Greg Acciaioli, "Pavilions and Posters: Showcasing Diversity and Development in Contemporary 
Indonesia," EIKON1 (1996): 27-42.
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dictated by government officials bent on constructing a generic type, whether of 
abode or costume, promulgating the message of sameness rather than 
difference.19
The construction of regional cultures became the vehicle for New Order cultural 
pluralism and an important focus for New Order cultural policy.
While the New Order regime came to power in 1965, a number of years passed 
before commentators began to accurately perceive and articulate its characteristics and 
strategies for maintaining control.20 This was largely because, until the elections in 
1972, the new military rulers were consolidating their hold on power and devising an 
approach to government that accorded with their political needs and ideological 
position.21 Following the fall of Sukarno and the state-sanctioned massacre of 
communists, regional practices in a number of locations stopped due to perceived 
connections between art forms, artists, and persecuted political parties. It was only in 
the early 1970s that these art forms returned, defended by bureaucratic or military 
backing. The state replaced the political parties as an important sponsor of the regional 
arts. Furthermore, the resources available for state intervention in culture increased 
markedly from the early 1970s due to substantial oil revenues and economic growth.22 
The first researchers to address the topic of New Order era cultural policy were 
anthropologists and researchers in the fields of regional arts, and their articles began to 
appear in the mid-1980s.23
In contrast to regional artists, practitioners of pan-Indonesian culture who were not 
affiliated with opposition political parties experienced a brief period of popularity and 
intellectual freedom in Jakarta following the start of the New Order state in 1965. This 
group of intellectuals was characterized in the 1960s and 1970s by the term "universal 
humanism," a term that arose through debates about and around the poet Chairil 
Anwar from the early 1950s.24 As political mobilization increased in the final years of 
the Sukarno regime in the early 1960s, universal humanism, understood in the 1960s as 
the assertion that "the autonomy of the individual artist, free from political 
involvement, was the precondition for genuine aesthetic achievement,"25 became the
19 Ibid., p. 39.
20 Ken Ward, "Indonesia's Modernisation: Ideology and Practice," in Showcase State: The Illusion of 
Indonesia's "Accelerated Modernisation," ed. Rex Mortimer (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973).
21 David Bourchier, "Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Monash 
University, 1996); and Ward, "Indonesia's Modernisation: Ideology and Practice."
22 Bisri Effendi, "Reyog Ponorogo: Kesenian Rakyat Dan Sentuhan Kekuasaan," Masyarakat Indonesia 2,24 
(1998): 205-27; Barbara Hatley, "Cultural Expression," in Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio­
cultural Change, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 216-66; Victoria M. Clara Van 
Groenendael, The Dalang Behind the Wayang (Foris: Dordrecht, 1985).
23 Acciaioli, "Culture as Art"; and Toby Alice Volkman, "Great Performances: Toraja Cultural Identity in 
the 1970s," American Ethnologist 11,1 (1984).
24 Keith Foulcher, "Literature, Cultural Politics and the Indonesian Revolution," in Text/Politics in Island 
Southeast Asia: Essays in Interpretation, ed. D. M. Roskies (Athens, OH: Ohio University Monographs in 
International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, 1993), pp. 221-56.
25 Ibid., p. 246. The term's meaning has altered over time. See also David Hill's research on the universal 
humanists in the 1980s. David T. Hill, Who's Left? Indonesian Literature in the Early 1980s, Working Paper 
No. 33 (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1984). An important document 
for this group was the Manifes Kebudayaan (Manikebu), a statement issued by a group of academics and 
artists in opposition to the politics and orientation of the supporters of Sukarno and the communist-
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rallying point of anti-Sukarno artists. In the years following the New Order era 
massacre and incarceration of communists and their alleged allies, "universal 
humanist" artists became closely aligned with young artists associated with the 
student movement and with modernizing intellectuals. They occupied a dissident 
niche26 78 where their actions and critical stance was, for the most part, tolerated by the 
New Order state.
Formed as a loose collection of affiliates, rather than an organization, this group 
was at the vanguard of cultural production and debate in the mid-to-late 1960s, when 
many members of the Indonesian opposition were killed, jailed, or marginalized. 
However, this group proved to be an awkward partner for the New Order state due to 
its members' commitment to freedom of expression. Their disavowal of mass politics, 
the apolitical position of many universal humanists, their preference for spiritually 
uplifting rather than political art, and their opposition to communism were features 
that would become entrenched in state-sanctioned approaches to culture. The 
universal humanists coalesced around the Ismail Marzuki Cultural Park (Taman Ismail 
Marzuki, TIM) that they helped create with the Governor of the Special Region of 
Jakarta, General Ali Sadikin, in 1968. As the New Order state consolidated its position 
of power, and imposed even stricter control following the Malari riots27 and large 
student demonstrations in 1977-78, independent and critical commentary was 
censored more strictly. TIM increasingly came under state control.28 Additionally, the 
views of the universal humanists (which were engrained in much of the arts 
establishment) were challenged by the development of alternative perspectives, such 
as the New Art Movement29 and contextual literature (sastra konteksual).30
Another change that began in the 1970s had implications for both pan-Indonesian 
artists and the New Order state. Declining attendance figures in the 1980s and 1990s 
forced TIM to open itself to commercial ventures such as a cinema complex and craft 
shops, and its management became increasingly oriented towards attracting private 
capital, signifying a decline in the popularity of the version of pan-Indonesian culture 
and arts in vogue since the mid-1970s.31 The marketplace increasingly became the
affiliated LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat). See Hill, Who's Left ?, and the account of the signatory 
Goenawan Mohamad: Goenawan Mohamad, The "Cultural Manifesto" Affair: Literature and Politics in 
Indonesia in the 1960s A Signatory's View, Working Paper No. 45 (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Monash University, 1988).
26 The term "dissident niche" is borrowed from Edward Aspinall, "Political Opposition and the Transition 
from Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2000).
27 Malari is an acronym for the Fifteenth of January Disaster (Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari), which refers to 
riots in January 1974 sparked by the visit of the Prime Minister of Japan. Those involved were protesting 
corruption, high prices, and government support for foreign investment that competed with local 
businesses.
28 For a discussion of TIM and the literary magazine Horison, see David T. Hill, '"The Two Leading 
Institutions': Taman Ismail Marzuki and Horison," in Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia, ed. 
Virginia Matheson Hooker (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 245-62.
29 Jim Supangkat, "Introduction to Indonesian Contemporary Art," paper presented at the Jakarta 
International Fine Art Exhibition, Jakarta, October 19-20,1994; and Jim Supangkat, Titik Sambung: Barli 
Dalam Wacana Seni Lukis Indonesia (Jakarta: Etnobook, 1996).
30 Keith Foulcher, "Sastera Konteksual: Recent Developments in Indonesian Literary Politics," RIMA 21,1 
(1987): 6-28.
31 Hill, "'The Two Leading Institutions': Taman Ismail Marzuki and Horison."
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provider of cultural goods for the majority of Indonesians in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
New Order's success at expanding the economy was also connected to significant 
social change. Between 1990 and 2000 (which includes three years of a severe economic 
downturn), consumer expenditure increased by a factor of 7.6 (from 117,120 billion 
rupiah to 888,631 billion rupiah). The most noticeable and far-reaching change that 
resulted from this growth has been the spread of consumer culture, portrayed in the 
writings about the New Rich32 and in a small body of research that also studies the 
consumption patterns of the urban working class.33
In Asia, the spread of consumer culture and the increasingly rapid movement of 
information associated with capitalist goods and services created some consternation 
among the national governments. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
China, and Burma opposed the cultural changes and the related political and social 
messages allegedly promulgated by international capitalism with a discourse that 
praised so-called "Asian values," which emphasized hard work, family values, respect 
for authority, social responsibility, discipline, and the citizens' support of their 
leaders.34 In the name of preserving Asian values, governments consolidated their 
political power by stirring up populist opposition against the West, a convenient 
bogeyman, and its supposedly lax values, and they maintained their political control 
by restricting press freedom and human rights by labelling them "Western" and 
thereby defining them as incompatible with an Asian way of life.3"
The New Order regime employed a version of Asian values in its attempts to 
influence the habits of its populace.36 Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher, for instance, 
write:
All the elements of "Asian values" can be found in the way the New Order 
attempted to clarify and institutionalise "Indonesian values." The ideals of family 
and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western "Other."37
32 Beng Huat Chua, ed., Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities, New Rich in Asia Series (London: 
Routledge, 2000); Michael Pinches, ed., Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, New Rich in Asia Series 
(London: Routledge, 1999); Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, eds., The New Rich in Asia: Mobile 
Phones, McDonald's, and Middle-class Revolution, New Rich in Asia Series (London: Routledge, 1996);
Krishna Sen and Maila Stivens, eds., Gender and Power in Affluent Asia, New Rich in Asia Series (London: 
Routledge, 1998).
33 Solvay Gerke, "Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class," in 
Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities, pp. 135-58; Tod Jones, "Bomb the Base in the Bus: Public 
Transport as Intersections of a Local Popular Culture in Padang, Indonesia," Continuum 22,1 (2008): 127-39; 
and Alison J. Murray, No Money, No Honey: A Study of Street Traders and Prostitutes in Jakarta (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1991).
34 David Birch, "Constructing Asian Values: National Identities and 'Responsible' Citizens," Social 
Semiotics 8,2/ 3 (1998): 177-201; and David Bourchier, "Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative 
Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation," Social Semiotics 8,2/3 (1998): 203-14.
35 Birch, "Constructing Asian Values: National Identities and 'Responsible' Citizens"; David Birch, "An 
'Open' Environment? Asian Case Studies in the Regulation of Public Culture," Continuum: Journal of Media 
and Cultural Studies 12,3 (1998): 335-48; Beng Huat Chua, "Consuming Asians: Ideas and Issues," in 
Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities, pp. 1-34.
36 Birch, "Constructing Asian Values: National Identities and 'Responsible' Citizens"; Bourchier, 
"Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation"; Adrian Vickers and 
Lyn Fisher, "Asian Values in Indonesia? National and Regional Identities," Sojourn 14,2 (1999): 382-401.
37 Vickers and Fisher, "Asian Values in Indonesia?" p. 398.
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An important feature of the Indonesian values discourse has been the political 
justification of a more authoritarian political system in response to criticisms from 
advocates of liberal-democratic models and associated individual rights.38 However, 
this "values" discourse was employed by the New Order state even more widely and 
pervasively as a form of control over cultural practices associated with the nation. The 
regime attempted to use the official state ideology of the Pancasila and associated 
programs to instill a model of conduct into the population through education and by 
influencing public debate. In this regard, David Birch's comment about Asian values 
also applied to Indonesia:
What we need to understand is that new realities, new definitions and new 
structures are being determined by powerful forces within the Asian region, 
driven by powerful economic capital and, aligned to that, the developing cultural 
capital of what constitutes the public cultures of "Asianness."39
Indonesian values discourses, as noted by Bourchier, also had a "proactive aspect," for 
they were used to help "create" Indonesian citizens.40 Before considering the influence 
of this state-supported narrative on Indonesian cultural policy, its characteristics need 
to be considered in more detail.
One of the first articles to focus on cultural policy was anthropologist Greg 
Acciaioli's article on the influence of the state on the relationship between cultural 
practices and communities, captured in the title of his article "Culture as Art: From 
Practice to Spectacle in Indonesia."41 In this work, Acciaioli laments (a term that recurs 
in the article) the way that the Suharto-era state's imposition of a "civic religion" across 
Indonesia, defined by references to the Pancasila and development (pembangunan, a 
term with strong connotations of paternalism and state control42) changes the ritual 
function of the arts, transforming certain customs into "art" and reordering life in the 
communities where those customs were followed. Acciaioli identifies three elements of 
this process that relate to cultural policy. First, he identifies how rituals were 
transformed to fit with the state's civic religion, including the application of moral 
standards that accorded with those of the dominant local religion (generally Islam or 
Christianity). Second, Acciaioli recognizes the level of power that officials must have 
been able to wield in order to dictate such changes to communities (also confirmed by
38 It should be noted that the "Indonesian values" discourse strengthened pre-existing discourses about 
Indonesian identity. Thus, this was not a new phenomenon so much as a reinforcement of a conservative 
understanding of Indonesian culture.
39 Birch, "Constructing Asian Values: National Identities and 'Responsible' Citizens," p. 198.
40 Bourchier, "Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation," p. 207. 
Researchers have assessed how values discourses have been used in the construction of Indonesian 
citizens through Leigh's and Parker's research on education; through Ramage's research on alternative 
readings of government discourses such as the Pancasila, including interpretations which are used to argue 
in favor of democratic reforms; and also through opposition to official discourse, such as opposition to the 
regime's assertion that individual rights are not an important aspect of being Indonesian. See Bourchier, 
"Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation"; and Vickers and Fisher, 
"Asian Values in Indonesia?" See also Barbara Leigh, "Making the Indonesian State: The Role of School 
Texts," RIMA 25,1 (1991): 17-43; Lynnette Parker, "The Creation of Indonesian Citizens in Balinese 
Primary Schools," RIMA 26,1 (1992): 42-70; and Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, 
and the Ideology of Tolerance, Politics in Asia Series (London: Routledge, 1995).
41 Acciaioli, "Culture as Art."
42 Ariel Heryanto, "The Development of'Development,'" Indonesia 46 (October 1988), pp. 1-24.
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Widodo43 and Weintraub44). Third, Acciaioli invokes Matthew Arnold in order to 
demonstrate that the Indonesian state conceived of itself as the "bringer of true 
Culture"45 46rather than holding the more anthropological view of "culture" as 
constituted by different ways of life, a wider interpretation that would have made it 
possible for the state to encourage and nourish a variety of cultures, both customary 
and pan-Indonesian.
Keith Foulcher's "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture: Patterns of 
Hegemony and Resistance"4b begins by echoing Acciaioli's points regarding the 
centrality of regional culture to Indonesia's cultural policy and the erosion of the ritual 
function of the arts. However, Foulcher's discussion of national culture is broader than 
Acciaioli's, as he establishes a framework to evaluate texts that engage with national 
culture. Foulcher identifies a key organizing principle of the New Order's approach to 
national culture: while "modern" cultural practices associated with technology and 
progress are required for "development," these practices are thought to bring about 
"negative side effects" in the form of lifestyle changes that have been characterized as 
foreign to Indonesia. To counteract these "side effects," the state vigorously 
constructed "Indonesian" values and traditions through a large investment in the 
promotion of the visual and decorative aspects of indigenous Indonesian cultures.
Foulcher identifies a second feature of cultural policy in Indonesia. He writes that:
... there has been an increasing tendency to align "Indonesia" with a redefined 
priyayi Java ... an eclectic combination of aspects of a kebatinan47 world view and 
the Dutch colonial mix of public morality and private self-interest, all elaborated 
against a backdrop of the arts, customs, and etiquette of the courts of Central 
Java.48
Foulcher thus argues both that elements of Javanese culture have been predominantly 
used to represent "Indonesian" culture, and that this "Indonesian" culture is the 
product of the process of transformation identified by Acciaioli, rather than an offshoot 
of Javanese court culture or an expression of the cultural diversity of the Javanese.49
Philip Yampolsky's article "Forces for Change in the Regional Performing Arts of 
Indonesia"50 differs from the two already discussed as it analyzes the history of
43 Widodo, "The Stages of the State."
44 Andrew N. Weintraub, "Contest-ing Culture: Sundanese Wayang Golek Purwa Competitions in New 
Order Indonesia," Asian Theatre Journal 18,1 (2001).
45 Acciaioli, "Culture as Art," p. 161.
46 Foulcher, "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture."
47 Kebatinan is Javanese for "spiritualism."
48 Foulcher, "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture," p. 303.
49 In addition to being an important organizing principle of New Order cultural policy, Foulcher argues 
that attempts to mitigate the "negative side effects" of development also underlay the promotion of 
nationalist symbols and gestures (such as the promotion of national heroes and state control of the 
national language). Clarke E. Cunningham, "Celebrating a Toba Batak National Hero: An Indonesian Rite 
of Identity," in Changing Lives, Changing Rites: Ritual and Social Dynamics in Philippine and Indonesian 
Uplands, ed. Susan D. Russell and Clarke E. Cunningham (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for South and Southeast 
Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1989); Janet Hoskins, "The Headhunter as Hero: Local Traditions 
and Their Reinterpretation in National History," American Ethnologist 14,4 (1987).
50 Yampolsky, "Forces for Change."
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Indonesian cultural policy with a focus on the New Order era. He begins with a 
discussion of section thirty-two of the Indonesian constitution, which stipulates that 
"The government shall advance the national culture of Indonesia/'51 and analyzes the 
confusion surrounding the government's definitions of national culture (as both 
hierarchical and plural) and the role of the state with regards to regional culture and 
what is referred to as "national" culture (kebudayaan bangsa). Yampolsky also discusses 
the official Clarification of section thirty-two, which reads:
The culture of the nation is culture that arises as the product of the thought and 
character of the entire people of Indonesia. Old and authentic culture is found in 
high cultural achievements [lit.: peaks of culture] in regions throughout 
Indonesia [and is] considered the culture of the nation. Cultural effort must be 
directed to the advancement of civilization, cultivation, and unification, and 
should not reject new materials from foreign culture that can develop and enrich 
the culture of the [Indonesian] people and raise the level of humanity of the 
Indonesian people.
Yampolsky, in particular, draws attention to the problems that result from 
designating "peaks of culture" and establishing contrasts between "old and authentic" 
cultures and new or hybrid cultural forms. Section thirty-two therefore provides the 
state with the obligation to "advance" a national culture and offers a confused 
definition of what constitutes that "national culture," clarified only by a reference to 
the "high cultural achievements in regions throughout Indonesia." After briefly 
discussing the cultural policies of the Indonesian state between 1945 and 1965, 
Yampolsky focuses on the New Order period, a time when oil revenues made a 
systematic set of cultural programs possible.
Yampolsky also provides a more detailed summary of the programs sponsored by 
the state's cultural apparatus, the Directorate of Culture. He describes the "thrust" of 
the directorate's activities as threefold. First, the directorate attempted to control the 
political content of artists' public performances through concentrating on 
incorporating government messages into speeches and song lyrics, and mandating the 
proper use of the Indonesian language. Second, the directorate sought to control moral 
content, to prevent any insult to the five official religions of Indonesia and proscribe 
any association with or portrayal of activities considered immoral (for instance, 
drunkenness and sexual license, which were associated with particular regional forms). 
Third, the directorate's activities have attempted to "upgrade artistic quality." Based 
on an assumption that regional arts are "too rough, too crude: not respectable," 
officials have incorporated "urban" standards (for staging, production values, 
programming, instruments, and costumes, to name a few aspects). Yampolsky 
identifies the festivals, competitions, and commissions sponsored by the directorate as 
its primary tools for influencing national culture.52
51 Ibid., p. 701.
52 While my focus has been on how these articles have characterized cultural policy, Yampolsky and 
Acciaioli draw attention to the introduction of mass-produced cultural products (in particular, cassettes 
and television) and tourism, and their transformative influences on regional culture. The Directorate of 
Culture did begin to address emerging popular forms and mass culture in the 1990s, but only in a very 
limited way, through research rather than policy intervention. Tod Jones, "Indonesian Cultural Policy, 
1950-2003: Culture, Institutions, Government" (PhD dissertation, Curtin University of Technology, 2006).
Cultural Policy in the Reform Era 157
The New Order state's cultural policies were put into effect by a substantial 
nationwide bureaucracy. At the end of Repelita VI in 1998, 74,722 people were 
employed full-time under the supervision of the Directorate of Culture across 
Indonesia, and many more were employed for specific tasks.53 There were sizable 
offices reporting to Jakarta in every province, city, and regency. A Penilik Bitdaya, or 
Cultural Officer, was designated to every subdistrict (kecamatan) in Indonesia and 
assigned a centrally determined set of tasks, reporting to a line office at the regency or 
city level.54 Independently of the line offices, a number of cultural institutions located 
in various provinces were organized so that their supervisors reported directly to the 
national office in Jakarta. These included the twenty-four Cultural Parks, eleven 
Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus, nine Preservation of Historical 
Remains and Archaeology Reserves, ten Archaeology Bureaus, six specialized 
museums, twenty-five provincial museums, and the Borobudur Research and 
Conservation Bureau. Centrally defined programs were being run across Indonesia by 
a large, centralized organization, leading cultural observer Jennifer Lindsay to write 
that, "By 1998, state control of cultural activity in Indonesia was so thorough that in 
retrospect it is difficult to pinpoint its incremental build-up over thirty-two years."55
In the 1990s, the regime's cultural policy still privileged a highly regulated model 
for guiding and fostering "national culture," despite the importance of the market as 
the provider of cultural goods. The government bureaucrats in charge of promulgating 
culture competed with entrepreneurs engaged in the market, who were also intent on 
providing Indonesians with entertainment, and this competition between the state and 
the market significantly changed how the majority of Indonesians gained access to 
culture and the choices available for them. In the 1990s, it became increasingly difficult 
for the government to regulate the media, for instance, because of the proliferation of 
different media outlets and technologies, providers, and means of production and 
distribution.56 Artists and observers also became more critical of the directorate's 
policies and positions during this period, as evidenced by the widespread criticism of 
Director General Sedyawati's support of the decision to ban Ratna Sarumpaet's play 
Marsinah, which portrays the story of a female labor activist who was killed by the 
military in 1993.57
The state responded to the challenges posed by the market in two ways in its 
cultural policies. First, it shifted its emphasis from the positive aspects of developing a 
national culture and began to focus, instead, on threats posed by negative outside
None of the articles discusses the context created by the annihilation of left-leaning political parties and 
affiliated artists in the mid-1960s, acts of suppression that created the conditions for the high level of state 
intervention that followed, although all of these authors and many of their readers would be well aware of 
these events. Keith Foulcher, Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts: The Indonesian "Institute o f Peoples' 
Culture," 1950-1965 (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1986); Hermawan 
Sulistyo, Palu Arit Di Ladang Tebu (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Gramedia Populer, 2000).
53 Direktorat Kebudayaan, "Laporan Hasil Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Program Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan 
Tahun 1994/ 95 S.D. 1998/ 99" (Jakarta: Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1999), pp. 10,12,13.
54 See Keputusan Kementerian Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 0304/0/1984.
55 J. Lindsay, "A New Artistic Order?" Inside Indonesia 93 (2008), retrieved on January 31, 2012, from 
www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles-93-j-ul-sep-2008/a-new-artistic-order-07091681
56 Krishna Sen and David T. Hill, Media, Culture, and Politics in Indonesia (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).
57 Goenawan Mohamad, "Surat Untuk Edi Sedyawati," Tempo, January 2,1998.
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influences that would weaken Indonesian culture unless efforts were made to protect 
the nation's cultural values and heritage. Second, some attempts were made to adapt 
cultural policy to the changing situation. Contemporary culture became a topic of 
research in Indonesia in the 1990s,58 although the amount of study focused on 
contemporary arts was still dwarfed by the attention given to indigenous cultural 
forms. Additionally, the Directorate of Culture began to organize a triennial 
Indonesian Arts Festival (beginning in 1995).
There are no connections to the field of cultural policy in these articles written in 
the 1990s, largely because most of them precede the turn to a new focus on state policy 
in cultural studies. Without a broader field of reference, the reader can grasp the 
differences that have distinguished the cultural policies of Indonesia from those of 
Western nations, but she gains little sense of the influence of international trends in 
governance on Indonesian policies. Tony Bennett's research provides a method of 
tracing these links through his application of Michel Foucault's theory of 
governmentality.59 60Bennett locates the origins of contemporary cultural policy in the 
beginnings of liberal rule, when liberal ideas were translated into policies and 
programs, informed by the emerging natural and historical sciences. He writes:
In the nineteenth century ... the most ardent advocates of public museums, free 
libraries, and the like typically spoke of them in connection with courts, prisons, 
poorhouses and, more mundanely, the provision of public sanitation and fresh 
water.80
Liberalism's focus on the freedom of its subjects and the growing use of the new fields 
of demographics and economics shaped the task of government. Now government was 
understood to be responsible for regulating naturally occurring processes in society 
through its measurement of populations, while, at the same time, adjusting policies to 
vary these rates to accord with state-sanctioned norms. 61 62 Regarding liberal 
government, Foucault stated:
The setting in place of ... mechanisms or modes of state intervention whose 
function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic 
processes, and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the 
basic objective of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as 
the right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses, and 
usurpations of the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of 
governmental rationality itself.82
Culture was part of the liberal mode of governance—a way of shaping conduct that 
was appropriate for a government that was committed in principle to securing the
58 Tod Jones, "Indonesian Cultural Policy, 1950-2003."
591 explore this topic in more detail through analysis of Indonesian cultural policy across the twentieth 
century in another paper. Tod Jones, "Liberalism and Cultural Policy in Indonesia," Social Identities 13,4 
(2007).
60 Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer's Science (London: Sage, 1998), p. 109.
61 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentaliti/, ed. Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87-104.
62 Foucault on April 5,1978, quoted in Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality.
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freedom of its subjects from state control, while also guiding them to well-being and 
prosperity. The application of liberal methods of governance in colonial nations 
differed considerably from their application in Europe. Indigenous colonial subjects 
were not thought to be in a fit condition to handle the rights of citizenship. The liberal 
scholar John Stuart Mill wrote in relation to the continuation of slavery that: "This 
mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing 
state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher 
stage of improvement."63
When Suharto and his allies began searching for a doctrine that would justify their 
continued rule, they found it in the defense and support of economic development,64 a 
concept that was pivotal in New Order cultural policy. In Indonesia, the term 
"development" (pembangunan) is understood to emphasize economic and physical 
development rather than the potentially dynamic project of nation building. The 
Indonesian government has employed its pro-development doctrine to depoliticize the 
allocation of state resources and invest more authority in the state, identified as the 
knower and arbiter of its subjects, although, as Tania Li observes, such claims are often 
and easily disturbed.65 Both Heryanto and Jonathan Rigg and his coauthors stress the 
particularities of pembangunan in Indonesia and show that the state discourse 
concerned with development has been assembled from both national and international 
semantic and political histories and had a special salience for the New Order regime.66 
An indication of the importance of pembangunan was a declaration by the 1983 
parliament that gave Suharto the title "Father of Pembangunan" (Bapak Pembangunan). 
Both Simon Philpott and Li identify development as a form of governmentalization of 
the state that was particularly important under Suharto.67 Pembangunan was connected 
to cultural policy both through alliances formed around the beginning of the New 
Order state, but also through the work of Ali Moertopo, an important strategist in the 
early years of the New Order who was highly influential in the Department of 
Education and Culture.68
Since 1945, numerous development programs have been implemented in 
postcolonial countries, often using aid money from Western states, with the goal of 
improving the practices and welfare of postcolonial subjects. Barry Hindess connects 
this "improving" function to the features of liberal colonial administration.69 Much like 6345789
63 John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 572-73.
64 Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development'"; Tania Li, "Compromising Power: Development, 
Culture, and Rule in Indonesia," Cultural Anthropology 14,3 (1999): 295-322; Philpott, Rethinking Indonesia.
65 Li, "Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia."
66 Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development'"; and Jonathan Rigg et al., "Understanding Languages 
of Modernisation: A Southeast Asian View," Modern Asian Studies 33,3 (1999): 581-602.
67 Li, "Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia"; and Philpott, Rethinking 
Indonesia.
68 Moertopo's book on cultural strategies outlines ideas that became important in cultural policy and 
broadly accepted in Indonesia. Greg Acciaioli, "'Archipelegic Culture' as an Exclusionary Government 
Discourse in Indonesia," The Asia Pacific Journal o f Anthropology 2,1 (2001): 1-23; Jones, "Indonesian 
Cultural Policy, 1950-2003: Culture, Institutions, Government," chapter 3; Ali Moertopo, Strategi 
Kebudayaan (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1978).
69 Barry Hindess, "The Liberal Government of Unfreedom," Alternatives 26,2 (2001): 93-111.
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the colonial subject, the subject of a development policy or program requires capacity 
building before he or she can achieve the goal of autonomous action. Hindess writes:
The aims of the [liberal] project have barely changed, but the end of empire has 
transformed the conditions in which it can be pursued ... the liberal project is 
now pursued by significant minorities in non-Western states, many of whom 
have adopted some version of the earlier liberal view of the people among whom 
they live, and also, more remotely, by Western states themselves working 
through a different range of indirect means. "
While I accept the central thrust of Hindess's argument about the continuities that link 
imperial rule and development projects, /! I would be more cautious about 
characterizing development as a "liberal project" given its varying forms in different 
nation-states, many of which were decidedly non-liberal and loudly rejected liberalism. 
Instead, development itself can be understood as an authoritarian form of governance, 
which is compatible with the internationally accepted liberal framework, exercised 
over and within non-Western nations in a range of programs, including programs 
concerned with population control, child rearing, and education.'2
The cultural policy approach taken in this article draws from Tony Bennett's 
argument that culture's connection with governance, and its role in modern 
governance, is the reason why culture and cultural institutions have proliferated. 
Bennett's focus on the governmental, programmatic, and instrumental conditions that 
give rise to cultural practices clearly informed his definition of culture:
Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as a 
historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in 
which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for 
transformation—in part via the extension through the social body of the forms, 
techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture.70 123
Understanding Indonesian cultural policy as constructed through authoritarian 
governance assists in explaining the characteristics of that policy identified by 
Acciaioli, Foulcher, and Yampolsky, and the reasons for the New Order state's huge 
investment in cultural projects. Unlike in Western nations during the same period, 
where artistic independence from government control was considered important, in
70 Ibid., p. 108.
71 The existence of a form of continuity is also suggested by the emergence in 1945 of the contemporary 
meaning of "development," at a time when many colonies became independent nation-states. Syed Alatas, 
in his book The Myth o f the Lazy Native, provides an interesting and relevant exploration of the historical 
links between colonial and developmental discourses. He writes regarding the representation of 
indigenous Southeast Asians: "The image of the indolent, dull, backward, and treacherous native has 
changed into that of a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the ladder of progress." See Syed 
Hussein Alatas, The Myth o f the Lazy Native (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 8.
72 Marc DuBois, "The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in 
Development," Alternatives 16,1 (1991): 1-30. The form of development practiced in Indonesia has been 
critiqued by economists (such as Amartya Sen), but was also admired before the Asian financial crisis as a 
remarkable economic achievement with the prospect of strong future growth. See Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (New York, NY: Knopf, 1999); and Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy since 1966: 
Southeast Asia's Emerging Giant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
73 Tony Bennett, "Putting Policy into Cultural Studies," in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary 
Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), pp. 23-37.
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Indonesia there was little focus on cultural or artistic freedom as the ideal condition for 
high-quality outcomes in the creation of artworks and performances. Pan-Indonesian 
artists, who generally advocated this principle of independence due to links with 
Western forms and ideas, were not subject to the same level of intervention as regional 
artists were, but they did suffer from state censorship. The level of intervention into 
regional arts by government officials, and the characterization of some regional arts as 
"too crude, too rough," fits well with the cultural policy model that posits the 
involvement of an authoritarian government. The reasons for the centrality of 
"development" in New Order discourse, and its use and importance to the Suharto 
regime, are also clear, as well as its importance to defining a set of ideals that underlay 
cultural policy interventions. The way interventions by the state corrected both the 
behavior of audiences (altering their interactions with performances through staging, 
enforcing moral standards) and altered the aesthetics of performance is perhaps the 
most direct example of how cultural policy operated on the bodies of performers in an 
authoritarian milieu. The question explored in the rest of this article is whether the 
authoritarian cultural policy model is relevant for Indonesia in the post-Suharto, 
Reformasi era. Has cultural policy changed, and, if so, what are the drivers of change?
Political Change in the Reform Era
Suharto's successor, B. J. Habibie, had little choice but to institute reforms, given 
the demands from numerous groups, popular support of Reformasi, and his need to 
prove his democratic credentials. 4 However, his reformist initiatives were mitigated 
by his close relationship with members of the Suharto-era elite. The two presidents 
who followed Habibie did not implement wide-ranging reforms. Following the 1999 
elections, Abdurrahman Wahid became president despite his National Development 
Party having won only 11 percent of the seats in parliament. This low level of support 
and Wahid's idiosyncratic leadership style caused widening divisions within his 
cabinet and in parliament," prevented pursuit of any extensive reforms, and led to the 
premature end of his government. Unlike Habibie and Megawati, Wahid attempted a 
number of cultural initiatives, perhaps because of his background as a serious 
intellectual with longstanding connections to the artistic and literary community. Two 
key Wahid initiatives were his pronouncements on ancestral religions, which helped 
relax restrictions around related cultural practices, and his decree legalizing 
communism, which led to a conservative backlash that precipitated his ouster from the 
presidency. 6 Megawati followed a conservative political agenda from the time of her 
inauguration in 2001. Following widespread celebration, Megawati disappointed 
reform-minded supporters and observers through her lack of leadership, particularly 7456
74 David Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism, and the Struggle for 
Power," in Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, ed. Chris Manning and Peter van 
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Emmerson (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
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in contentious policy areas, and her lack of zeal in fighting corruption,77 The first three 
post-Suharto presidents were thus unable or unwilling to pursue reforms that would 
extensively alter the existing power structure, The presidency of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono has been more stable than his predecessors' and has made progress on 
both economic and anti-corruption fronts,78 Yudhoyono has not, however, claimed his 
place as a forceful, independent leader of the nation; one commentator called his style 
of governance "hesitant, procrastinating—if more consultative,"79
Initial assessments of the Reformasi era classified it a "transitional period," a time 
when Indonesia was gaining the features of a liberal democratic polity,80 Indeed, 
Indonesia did develop some of these attributes, including free and fair elections and a 
legislature that is now central to law making, However, the post-Suharto political and 
electoral reforms tended to entrench the power of the legislature and political parties 
without ensuring that the elected politicians were held clearly and directly accountable 
to voters,81 Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz argue that the political-business 
groupings (oligarchies) of the New Order regime have adjusted to take advantage of 
the new political climate and institutions, limiting the possibilities of political and 
economic reform,82 Moderate observers, like Harold Crouch, have reached similar 
conclusions regarding the limited extent of reform, Crouch writes that "the state is 
weak because it itself is made up of powerful competing vested interests, The state has 
been penetrated by interests that are opposed to reform,"83 Although there have been 
more positive signs of reform initiatives under Yudhoyono than under his 
predecessors,84 the process has been slow, The picture that emerges from political 
analysis is of a country where the groups most committed to democratic reform have 
struggled to exert influence over political processes, and far-reaching democratic 
change has been resisted, Institutional change did happen, but it was initiated within 
divided political institutions that were responsive to groups and interests that favored 
the status quo,
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Immediate Impact of Reformasi: Winding Back State Control of the Arts
An immediate impact of Reformasi was a widespread demand for freedom of 
expression that was quickly manifest in the candid reporting of the crisis in the media 
and among contemporary urban artists. The early manifestations of Reformasi need to 
be distinguished from later changes that emanated from the bureaucracy and the 
Reform-era regimes. The immediate changes were generated through popular pressure 
for reform, combined with demands from media organizations and their audiences for 
a more critical media,85 and they were carried out without the involvement of the state. 
Contemporary urban artists working mainly in pan-Indonesian forms were among 
those who were most involved in Reformasi. They quickly began to incorporate 
Reformasi themes in their works and became increasingly critical of social and political 
events.86 Another effect of the reformist tendencies amongst pan-Indonesian artists was 
the almost immediate rejection of the state's licensing protocol for arts events in many 
urban areas.
In the cities, the licensing regime ended quickly after the fall of Suharto, as the 
organizations and individuals who held arts events stopped asking for permits, and 
the police no longer enforced the requirements. The end of the licensing regime has 
facilitated the emergence of small arts institutions and performance venues throughout 
Indonesia. One such venue is Rumah Nusantara, in Bandung, West Java. A group of 
local artists headed by Aat Soeratin, a well-known local actor from television and 
theater, began Rumah Nusantara at the end of 1998.87 Rumah Nusantara is based in a 
house on the outskirts of Bandung that has been transformed into a performance space, 
shop, and cafeteria. The house has been provided to the organization rent free and, 
instead of charging for tickets to events, Rumah Nusantara staff collect donations from 
audiences at the end of a performance. Performers usually donate their time and are 
friends of members of the organizing committee. Although this arrangement makes 
programming difficult, Rumah Nusantara manages to stage regular performances that 
are reasonably well attended. An arts institution like Rumah Nusantara could not have 
survived the New Order era level of regulation with any public prominence. Similar 
arts organizations have sprung up in other cities as well. Notably, there is Kedai Kebun 
in Yogyakarta88 and Komunitas Salihara in Jakarta; the latter is a comparatively well- 
funded project that provides alternative performance space to artists and would have 
been difficult to run under the New Order censorship regime.89 The increased degree 
of flexibility in regulation of the arts has provided space for initially smaller, and now 
larger, arts organizations to grow.
The end of the licensing regime has only been partial. At the conclusion of 2003, 
artists outside of the large cities, such as in Cirebon (130 kilometers from Bandung, and 
also in West Java), were still seeking permits from the government and paying police 
and their local cultural office for licenses. This difference between the conditions faced
85 Sen and Hill, Media, Culture, and Politics in Indonesia.
86 Enin Supriyanto, "Buah Tangan Dari Perjalanan Ke Tiga Benua," in Mudik: "Arms! Recent Art from 
Indonesia," 1999-2002, ed. Tim Yayasan Seni Cemeti (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Seni Cemeti, 2002).
87 Interview with Aat Soeratin, Bandung, West Java, November 19, 2001.
88 See http:/ /kedaikebun.com/, accessed January 2, 2012.
89 See http: / / salihara.org/, accessed January 2, 2012.
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by pan-Indonesian artists and those encountered by practitioners of regional arts 
reflects the uneven impact of Reformasi and the continuation of a division between how 
the two lands of artists relate to the state. Pan-Indonesian artists have adopted 
Reformasi themes and become increasingly vocal in their criticism of social and political 
events, in addition to benefiting from the end of the licensing regime of arts events. 
There has not been an equivalent impact among regional artists who were less 
involved in the largely urban Reformasi movement.
Decentralization, and the Growth of Ethnic and Local Identity Politics
In contrast to the immediate, fragmentary changes initiated by citizens inspired by 
Reformasi, the changes brought about by institutions during the reform era have altered 
cultural policy more broadly and consistently across the archipelago. Following the fall 
of Suharto, observers of Indonesian politics noted a change in the level at which 
important political decisions were being made. For instance, Edward Aspinall and 
Greg Fealy indicate the new political importance of sub-national levels through their 
call to focus on comprehending "what is happening at the local level,"90 and Gerry van 
Klinken has called for a "disaggregation" of the Indonesian state in Indonesian 
political analysis.91 Such changes have implications for cultural policy. The overlap 
among a number of new conditions—such as the splintering of political power, the 
mobilization of ethnic and local identities through cultural events and groups, and 
institutional changes to the state's cultural apparatus due to decentralization—is 
complex. To understand how these conditions intersect, we must consider the social 
and political pressures at the national and sub-national levels.
The fall of Suharto was accelerated, in part, by increasing opposition from regional 
elites who had felt ignored and sidelined during the New Order era. Particularly 
prominent among the regions that demonstrated separatist and federalist aspirations 
were four provinces rich in natural resources: Aceh, Papua, Riau, and East 
Kalimantan.92 The East Timorese were engaged in fighting for independence. Habibie 
responded to these challenges with a piece of legislation that has shaped reform era 
politics. The Regional Autonomy (Otonomi Daerah) legislation was passed in August 
1999, and was touted as a response to federalist and separatist ambitions and cited as 
proof of the president's and parliament's democratic credentials.93 The central element 
in the bill was the decentralization of various areas of government, including the 
offices of education, health, the environment, labor, public works, natural resource 
management, and tourism and culture, such that a large measure of authority 
devolved to the regency/municipal level, along with a much larger share of revenue 
and the power to raise revenue.94 Another important element is that appointments at
90 Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, "Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation, and the Rise of the 
Local," in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, p. 11.
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32,2 (2001): 3.
92 Aspinall and Fealy, "Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation, and the Rise of the Local."
93 Tod Jones, "National Culture, Local Concerns: Debating Otonomi Daerah," in Beyond Jakarta: Regional 
Autonomy and Local Society in Indonesia, ed. Minako Sakai (Adelaide: Crawford, 2002).
94 For a more detailed analysis, see: Aspinall and Fealy, "Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation, 
and the Rise of the Local"; Wihana Kirana Jaya, "Fiscal Decentralisation and Its Impacts on Local
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all levels of government are now made by the concomitant legislatures, not the 
national executive, as was previously the case.
In the context of these changes, it is not surprising that local elites made use of 
ethnic identity to attract support and reinforce their authority. Van Klinken, in his 
exploration of the new and significantly altered political patterns emerging in Central 
and East Kalimantan, demonstrates the increasing importance of ethnic identity to 
local elites in local political configurations, particularly in contests over control of the 
state.95 Research from this time records a growing politicization of ethnic identity in a 
variety of locations across Indonesia,96 including Jakarta, and a renewed importance for 
ethnic organizations that can operate as political machines at a local level.97 In 
Bandung, for instance, the mayor has a close relationship with the Siliwangi Youth 
Force (Angkatan Muda Siliwangi, AMS). AMS was formed as part of the anti­
communist crackdown, and its name refers to legendary Sundanese kings who ruled 
the Sunda kingdom in West Java. AMS was involved in protests opposing the reform 
of the city administration and in support of the construction of highly profitable 
subdivisions in a conservation zone.98 A related trend in Bandung has been the 
widespread demand that important local positions in the bureaucracy be given to 
"native sons" (putra daerah).99
The reform era has also seen an explosion of new political units, with their 
associated legislatures and administrations. Between 1999 and 2007, the number of 
provinces has expanded from twenty-six to thirty-three, while the number of 
regencies/municipalities has expanded from 303 to 456, with over five thousand local 
government bodies (kecamatan) now operating in Indonesia. State recognition can have 
a substantial impact on the funding and promotion of regional culture, particularly 
when certain cultural practices are promoted as representative of the largest ethnic 
group in the area, and also the locality.100 Evidence is emerging of a revival of cultural
Government Revenue in Indonesia," in Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Society in Indonesia; 
Ryaas Rasyid, "Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia," in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
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Movements in Indonesia," in Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Society in Indonesia.
95 Gerry van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elite," in Indonesia in Search o f Transition, ed. Henk Schulte 
Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), pp. 67-105.
96 David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson, "Introduction: Radical Conservatism—The Protean Politics of 
Adat," in The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics, ed. David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2007); Minako Sakai, "The Privatisation of Padang Cement Regional Identity and 
Economic Hegemony in the New Era of Decentralisation," in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
Decentralisation and Democratisation.
97 These organizations are often involved in legal and illegal activities, and they can influence local politics 
through their support and endorsement of local politicians. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 
"Introduction," in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Henk Schulte 
Nordholt and Gerry Van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV, 2007).
98 Rochman Achwan and Meuthia Ganie-Rochman, "Civic Organisations and Governance Reform in 
Indonesian Cities," Asian Journal of Social Science 37 (2009): 799-820; and Gustaf Reerink, "When Money 
Rules over Voice," Inside Indonesia 98 (2009).
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practices by ethnic groups that had previously figured as minority factions in 
comparatively large administrative regions, but have become the majority groups since 
the administrative regions in which they reside have shrunk. There has also been a 
revival of royal houses (kraton) in a number of locations, which in West Kalimantan 
and Banten have connections to new administrative areas, while the phenomenon itself 
is closely linked to political decentralization and the increased importance of local 
support.101
Accompanying the political mobilization of people along lines of ethnic and local 
identity is the growth of ethnic and local cultural practices. The links between political 
decentralization, local and national power structures, and regional practices in a 
number of locations across Indonesia is explored in the edited volume The Revival of 
Tradition in Indonesian Politics.102 Jamie Davidson and David Henley note that this 
"revival" encompasses both increased public interest in regional practices that have 
broad implications for local politics and government, as well as more narrowly artistic 
cultural revivals, which have little influence on politics, and that the revivals can be 
either secular or connected to religion.103 While the dynamics of this general "revival of 
tradition" are diverse, there are increasing opportunities for groups with regional 
knowledge to contest political decisions that have been usually made by the political 
elite; those challenging the elite increasingly use and refer to regional traditions and 
customs.104 The dark side of this revival is the use of tradition to justify excluding 
migrants from resources or targeting them for discrimination, including monetary 
payments,105 and, in some cases, deadly violence.106 Bali and West Sumatra have both 
strengthened versions of the traditional systems of local governance and weakened the 
desa system forced on them by the New Order regime.107 Greg Acciaioli has studied a 
similar case and describes a return to traditional legal systems among the To Lindu 
people in Central Sulawesi following the end of New Order centralism.108 109In Bandung, 
local content, particularly Sundanese language, customs, and crafts, has been 
integrated into school curriculums.104
The growth of ethnic identity politics has also produced a series of large 
conferences on local ethnic cultures, often sponsored by local government and 
international organizations. These conferences have drawn attention to the central
101 Gerry van Klinken, "Return of the Sultans: The Communitarian Turn in Local Politics," in The Revival of 
Tradition in Indonesian Politics.
102 Henley and Davidson, eds., The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.
103 Jamie S. Davidson, "Culture and Rights in Ethnic Violence," in The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian 
Politics.
104 Maribeth Erb, "Shaping a 'New Manggarai': Struggles over Culture and Tradition in an Eastern 
Indonesian Regency," Asia Pacific Viewpoint 46,3 (2005).
105 Carol Warren, "Adat in Balinese Discourse and Practice," in The Revival o f Tradition in Indonesian Politics.
106 Henley and Davidson, eds., The Revival o f Tradition in Indonesian Politics.
107 Renske Biezeveld, "The Many Roles of Adat in West Sumatra," in The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian 
Politics; and Warren, "Adat in Balinese Discourse and Practice."
108 Greg Acciaioli, "Re-Empowering the Art of the Elders: The Revitalisation of Adat among the To Lindu 
People of Central Sulawesi and Contemporary Indonesia," in Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local 
Society in Indonesia.
109 In 2001, the regencies in Bandung had drafted legislation to include in the curriculum for all primary- 
school-aged children opportunities to view and experience local arts. Interview with Dana Setia, Bandung, 
November 20, 2001.
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state's neglect of particular indigenous ethnic cultures and have been often linked to 
conservative political positions that marginalize migrants, alienating them from both 
political and cultural resources.110 For instance, Ajip Rosidi's opening address at the 
International Conference of Sundanese Culture (Konferensi Internasional Budaya 
Sunda, KIBS) in Bandung, West Java, from August 22 to 25, 2001, stressed the lack of 
national government concern for Sundanese culture, a need for government action to 
address Sundanese cultural decline due to encroachment from consumer culture and 
the cultures of migrants to the region, and the importance of international linkages for 
both the recognition of, and research into, Sundanese culture.111 Sundanese are the 
largest ethnic group in West Java and are indigenous to the region. KIBS's primary 
sponsor was the Toyota Foundation, followed by the West Java Provincial 
Government. KIBS followed similar conferences that had been held in Central 
Kalimantan in December 1998, Riau in January-February 2000, Papua in May-June 
2000, and Minahasa in August 2000,112 as well as a conference focused on Malay 
identity held in Batam in September 2001.113 14These conferences are products of the links 
between regional culture, customary governance structures, and electoral politics, 
linkages that have been strengthened by political decentralization and the engagement 
of international organizations.
Structural Change and Resistance in the Directorate of Culture
A potential sea change in cultural policy was signaled in 1999 through a 
restructuring of the Directorate of Culture, so that culture is now linked to tourism 
rather than education. The move to tourism, although accomplished during the reform 
era, had its origins in the structure of Suharto's short-lived final cabinet. The national 
guiding policy document, Broad Outline of State Policy 1999-2004 (Garis Besar Hainan 
Negara 1999-2004, GBHN) provides insights into how this revision of the directorate's 
structure interacted with the authoritarian cultural policy model. The GBHN indicates 
that New Order era discourses remain important for framing cultural policy, 
particularly through the following broad statement:
To cultivate and manage the national culture of the Indonesian nation, which has 
its origins in the noble cultural heritage of the nation, national culture that 
contains universal values including belief in the one true God has the goal of 
supporting the care of harmony in social life and developing the national 
civilization."4
110 Jones, "Indonesian Cultural Policy, 1950-2003."
111 Ajip Rosidi, "Mengapa Kibs?" paper presented at the Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda, Bandung, 
2001.
112 Van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elite."
113 smn, "Ada Kesadaran Etnik Untuk Kembali Ke Akar Budaya," Kompas, September 7, 2001.
114 The GBHN elsewhere confirms the continued centrality of national development by its statement that a 
critical attitude to cultural values needs to be maintained to develop values that are conducive to "facing 
opposition to national development in the future." Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, Gnris-Garis Besar Hainan 
Negara 1999-2004 (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 1999), p. 30.
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The high priority given to the promotion of tourism also brought about some change, 
in particular through configuring "traditional arts and culture" as a "vehicle" for the 
development of national tourism and its promotion overseas.' 7
Internally, the directorate has undergone numerous restructurings. The key 
elements of the restructure were the division of the Directorate of Culture into two 
directorates—the Directorate of Cultural Values, Art, and Film (Directorat Nilai 
Budaya, Seni dan Film), and the Directorate of History and Archaeology (Direktorat 
Sejarah dan Purbakala)—and the inclusion of mass cultural forms, specifically film and 
video, within the purview of official cultural policy.15 16 Two broader changes also 
reconfigured the culture portfolio: the process of decentralization, and the related 
downgrading of the Directorate of Culture to a state ministry, which led to a reduction 
in funding and staff.117 In the cultural portfolio, decentralization meant that regional 
offices that had previously been part of the national bureaucracy, as well as a number 
of special purpose units, which included the Cultural Parks (Taman Budaya), 
provincial museums, and a range of research institutions, now came under the control 
of the lower levels of government."8Bureaucrats within the Directorate of Culture 
have generally not responded well to these changes. Most share a commitment, thanks 
to their own studies and work history, to promoting culture as a tool of national 
development, and they conceive of culture's role as central to maintaining national 
cohesion and identity. Cultural commentators Teuke Jacob and Rahman Arge, free 
from the burden of state employment, have accused the government of neglecting its 
duty to lead the nation in the promotion of Indonesian culture, a duty mandated by the 
1945 Constitution, and of thereby "stunting" cultural growth. Despite sustained 
protests,119 presidential and cabinet support for the reconfiguration of the directorate 
and its mission could not be overcome.
More recently, the state has proposed legislation intended to establish intellectual 
property laws that seek to address and protect cultural traditions.120 Based on World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) initiatives to strengthen intellectual 
property regimes in developing countries and trade agreements, Indonesia's 2002 
copyright law protects individual creators in ways that are modeled on Western 
legislation. It also includes cultural-property provisions that award "folklore and 
people's cultural products" to the state in perpetuity and "works whose creators are 
not known" to the state "on behalf of the interests of the creator" for fifty years. The
115 Ibid., p. 31.
116 The goals for film may not please either commercial or independent filmmakers. According to the 
GBHN, film is included to ensure "healthy" cinematic developments in order to "improve religious 
morality and national astuteness, develop positive public opinion, and increase economic value." Ibid.
117 LOK, "Kementarian Budpar Diharapkan Tetap Dipertahankan," Kompns, March 12, 2004.
118 These were the Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus (11), the Preservation of Historical 
Remains and Archaeology Reserves (9), Archaeology Bureaus (10), special museums and the National 
Museum (6), the National Gallery, and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau.
119 Protests were covered in the media and occurred during the Fifth Cultural Congress in West Sumatra in 
October 2003. The recommendation for an "autonomous" Department of Culture was even one of the 
formal recommendations of the conference. MAM, "Rekomendasi Kongres Kebudayaan Agak 
Emosional," Kompns, October 24, 2003.
120 Lorraine V. Aragon and James Leach, "Arts and Owners: Intellectual Property Law and the Politics of 
Scale in Indonesian Arts," American Ethnologist 35,4 (2008).
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specific implementing legislation was not passed by the end of 2009,121 despite 
intentions to implement this legislation before 2010l22 123and the release of a draft law, 
which was expected to lay the groundwork for passage of the final law. The draft law 
escalates bureaucratic supervision of regional cultural practices through regulation of 
reproductions or adaptations of material arts, music, theater, dance, stories, and ritual 
ceremonies under the rationale of protecting artists' and communities' rights and 
increasing national prosperity through the creation of wealth. Improper attribution of 
artworks, offensive uses of these forms, or a failure to obtain the appropriate 
agreements and licenses would lead to civil or criminal penalties under the draft law. 
In their analysis of this legislation, Lorraine Aragon and James Leach argue that the 
division between individual rights and community rights ignores the priorities of 
practitioners, which they characterize as "locally autonomous access to, and culturally 
normative use of, their arts canon, not exclusive and legalized ownership."122
The most recent cabinet reorganization, in October 2011, has seen the culture 
portfolio moved and linked once again to education in the Ministry of Education and 
Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan), but a policy portfolio of the 
"creative economy" has been left with tourism in the Ministry of Tourism and the 
Creative Economy (Kementarian Pariwisata dan Ekonomi Kreatif). The two 
directorates of culture will be once again united, but with question marks over the 
relationships between different ministries and directorates. The division splits the 
regulation of mass cultural forms (including mass media, music) between the 
Department of Communication and Informatics (Kementarian Komunikasi dan 
Informatika, formerly the Ministry of Information), and the Ministry of Tourism and 
the Creative Economy, while including other areas, such as performing arts and fine 
arts, in the latter Ministry and the Ministry of Education and Culture. This division 
signals that the state has decided to pursue the creative economy agenda through trade 
and industry policies in specific areas of activity rather than through the Directorate of 
Culture and its view of culture as influencing development through shaping the 
behaviors and attitudes of Indonesians.124
Underlying both the amalgamation of cultural development with tourism and the 
drafting of intellectual property legislation was a shift in the function of culture for the 
state; culture is no longer perceived as exclusively a tool of nation building, intended 
to foster national unity, but has shifted to a greater emphasis on generating 
employment and revenue from culture, via tourism, and now also a creative industries 
model. Such a change, although consistent with patterns in other countries and the 
push for creative industries, contradicts the New Order era focus on protecting culture 
from outside influences, although this perspective is still prominent in the 
bureaucracy. Yet the Yampolsky article, discussed above, suggests there is little 
contradiction between these sets of goals if they are viewed from a wider perspective.
121 Antara, "Ri Encourages Adoption of Cultural Heritage Convention," Atitara, August 27, 2009.
122 Indah Setiawati, "[Government] Promises Bill to Protect Culture," The Jakarta Post, December 4, 2008.
123 Aragon and Leach, "Arts and Owners," p. 620.
124 The key documents for this shift are found in a set of reports from 2008, published by the Department 
of Trade, outlining and advocating a creative industry model. See Kolompok Kerja Indonesia Design 
Power, "Pengembangan Ekonomi Kreatif Indonesia 2025" (Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan, 2008); and 
Kelompok Kerja Indonesia Design Power, "Pengembangan Ekonomi Kreatif Indonesia 2025" (Jakarta: 
Departemen Perdagangan, 2008).
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Addressing the state and tourism, Yampolsky argues that the processes are not 
opposed but instead reinforce each other, as they both redesign indigenous arts "for 
external consumption, whether by tourists ... or festival audiences."125 126Viewed from 
this perspective, the directorate has not altered its character significantly, for it remains 
an intrusive and state-oriented entity that continues to justify its own activities by 
asserting that they strengthen the nation by fostering economic growth. The degree to 
which the creative economy agenda will involve the Directorate of Culture is unclear at 
this stage, as is the extent to which it will influence its traditional policy areas.
Cultural Policy in Decentralized Indonesia: The Characteristics of Regional 
Diversity
Decentralization, in addition to making the state more sympathetic to popular 
concerns about local majority ethnic cultures and the demands of ethnic cultural 
organizations, has also created opportunities for non-national levels of government to 
reassess policy content. Although the responsibility for most cultural policy activities 
was decentralized and relegated to the regency and city governments,12b some 
responsibility was shouldered by the provincial governments, including management 
of the cultural parks, museums, and the provincial-level cultural office, and the 
coordination of province-wide cultural activities. Decentralization created 
opportunities for provincial and regency level governments to restructure the cultural 
apparatus that came under their control and reassess their priorities. In West Java, four 
departments were brought together to form the Provincial Office for Culture and 
Tourism.
The West Java strategic planning process for 2001 to 2005 continued to reflect the 
"development" approach of the New Order period. "West Java regional culture" was 
defined as "the basic capital and the dominant factor in supporting the success of 
national development," and was therefore deemed in need of close supervision.127 The 
new Office of Tourism and Culture limited the scope of culture to the regional, 
indigenous culture and arts of West Java, excluding contemporary and popular culture 
and arts and the culture of migrants from other places inside and outside of Indonesia. 
A second planning document, put together by the United States-educated Head of the 
West Java Culture and Tourism Office, advocated the implementation of "good 
governance" through a strategy of "customer service." This document was couched in 
terms that reflected a neo-liberal policy approach that typically promotes individual 
development, primarily through staff development and partnerships with the private 
sector.128
An event in West Java that incorporated a variety of (at times contradictory) 
approaches was the stakeholder policy-planning process held in November 2001. The
125 Yampolsky, "Forces for Change," p. 714.
126 Indonesia has six levels of government administration: national, provincial, regency, city, local 
(kecamatan), and village. The village level is unimportant in many urban areas.
127 Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, "Rencana Strategik Dinas Kebudayaan Dan Pariwisata" (Bandung: 
Propinsi Jawa Barat, 2001), p. 222.
128 Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, "Kerangka Pemikiran Aparatur Dinas Kebudayaan Dan Pariwisata 
Propinsi Jawa Barat" (Bandung: Propinsi Jawa Barat, 2001).
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purpose of the Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java was to establish an 
agenda for culture and tourism and address the issues, concerns, and potential benefits 
of combining the two areas. While it criticized cultural policy for focusing too much on 
state institutions and not enough on public participation, the final report also drew 
from New Order era policy discourses in its focus on "preserving" the culture of the 
Sundanese (the largest ethnic group in West Java) and combating negative foreign 
influences.129 Journalist Abdullah Mustappa observed that not many of the suggestions 
were new and some differed little from established practice.130 13However, the access 
granted to a broad group of stakeholders and a broad set of cultural practitioners from 
across West Java constituted a substantial change from the nationally centralized 
process of cultural policy making that had prevailed during the New Order era. In 
West Java, new discourses about the role of the state and a greater inclusiveness in 
policy formation indicated that change is possible, while suggesting that this change 
would come about through a slow and incremental process.
The impacts of decentralization on cultural institutions were varied. While some 
Cultural Parks (Taman Budaya)'M were no longer conducting activities and were only 
used as practice venues in some regions (such as West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and 
South Sulawesi), other Cultural Parks had received increased funding from provincial 
administrations (for instance, in West Java, Surakarta, and East Java). Decisions on 
funding were dependent on a variety of factors, including the finances of each 
respective province, the importance of support of the arts as a method for generating 
and maintaining political support in an ethnic constituency, and the attitude of the 
political party and individuals in power towards the role of the arts in society. The 
evolution of the West Java Cultural Park (WJCP) exemplifies the incremental process of 
change that typically affected these institutions during Reformasi. The WJCP became 
more focused on holding performances and exhibitions and drawing in visitors from 
the local community and abroad. The increased activity has raised its standing in the 
local arts community, although it is still viewed as overly concerned with bureaucratic 
goals rather than contributions to the arts. Iyus Supriatna, the director of the WJCP, has 
noted a slight change in types of performances. While the WJCP was under the 
Directorate of Culture, the Cultural Park hosted many visiting troupes of performers 
from other areas, but the provincial government is now more focused on staging art 
from West Java. Supriatna also noted that, although the provincial government now 
approves the budget and yearly schedule of activities, at the end of 2001 the same 
"Technical Instructions" that had long been used were still in force, and the WJCP's 
routines remain unchanged. In the strategic plans developed by the Provincial Office 
for Culture and Tourism, the WJCP was given the task of "developing culture and 
increasing the appreciation of society towards culture."132 Its three tasks were: first,
129 Diro Aritonang et al., "Rumusan Hasil Dialog Peta Dan Agenda Kebudayaan Dan Pariwisata Jawa 
Barat 2002-2006" (Bandung: Panitia Dialog Peta dan Agenda Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001).
130 Abdullah Mustappa, "Budaya Rekomendasi," Pikiran Rakyat, November 15, 2001.
131 "Cultural Parks" is the literal interpretation of Taman Budaya, and is preferred over "Cultural Centers," 
as another set of institutions were specifically called "Cultural Centers" (Pusat Kebudayaan). The word 
Taman has nationalist connotations due to the prominence of the Taman Siszva schools established by Ki 
Hadjar Dewantara. The Cultural Parks comprised a group of buildings and one or more venues that often 
included a museum and research institutions.
132 Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, "Strategi Pengembangan Kebudayaan Dan Peningkatan Daya 
Apresiatif Masyarakat Terhadap Kebudayaan" (Bandung: Propinsi Jawa Barat, 2001), p. 1.
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developing art through collaboration, revitalizing and increasing public appreciation 
of art, and increasing the creativity and capacity of artists; second, nurturing art 
through protecting, researching, inventorying, reconstructing, and documenting art; 
and, third, using art for education, rituals, and religion, for helping the economy and 
increasing tourism, and to enrich the diversity of art. In summary, the role and 
programs of the WJCP have remained relatively unchanged although the Cultural Park 
has gained prominence as a performance venue.133
Decentralization brought positive changes to some regions. In the Bantul regency 
in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, a group of performers and admirers of the 
indigenous popular theater genre ketoprak established the Bantul Ketoprak 
Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ketoprak Bantul, FKKB). The FKKB 
draws its membership from each of the areas within the regency and has broad-based 
support. It successfully lobbied the government for public funding to subsidize 
performances,134 and it regularly documents its use of those funds for the local 
legislature.135 The relationship between the FKKB and the regency reflects a liberal 
approach to cultural governance, such that a group of active cultural workers can 
lobby for public funding for mutually agreeable goals and then report outcomes to an 
elected assembly. This arrangement contrasts with structures prevalent during the 
New Order era, during which the vast majority of state-funded cultural activities were 
implemented by state institutions.
This does not mean that all cultural institutions have benefited from 
decentralization. In decentralized Indonesia, funding for cultural policy is reliant on 
the attitude of the regent.136 FKKB was fortunate because the Regent of Bantul strongly 
supported local culture, but members were concerned that future funding would 
shrink if the regent stepped down. In other regencies where Islamic political parties 
were in the majority, such as Depok and Indramayu (both in West Java), cultural 
policy funding was stopped altogether.137 Conservative Islamic politicians do not view 
culture as an appropriate medium for teaching the lessons of citizenship, instead 
preferring Islamic education. While there are increased opportunities to make claims 
for resources based on cultural rights, competition for funding is fierce, and many 
cultural workers I spoke to reported reductions in public monies for cultural activities. 
Hence decentralization has created a highly varied funding landscape, with
133 A seminar to discuss the "repositioning" of the WJCP following decentralization indicated that the arts 
community in West Java desired a change in operation. Many of the speakers voiced criticisms similar to 
those heard during the New Order era. The reform most frequently recommended called for loosening the 
"bureaucratic style" of the WJCP by increasing its flexibility, increasing its networks with other arts 
institutions and artists, and making strategic decisions to transform the WJCP into a "public possession." 
Speakers suggested privatizing some of the WJCP's operations; reducing the number of events to focus on 
large, popular performances; broadening the performance genres; and making the institution independent 
from the provincial government. See Soni Farid Maulana and Ahda Imran, "Sarasehan Reposisi Taman 
Budaya Jawa Barat: Fleksibilitas, Network, Gula Dan Semut," Pikirnn Rakyat, November 9, 2000.
134 Each region has its own committee and receives a designated portion of funding.
135 Ketoprak is expensive to produce due to the large scale of its productions (some involving hundreds of 
people) and its elaborate costumes. The FKKP organized two large ketoprak festivals in 2005, one of which 
was broadcast on local television and on a popular local radio show.
136 The regent (btipati) is the head of a regency (kabupaten) and holds a position equivalent to that of a 
mayor.
137 Bondan Nusantara, interview, Bantul, January 5, 2006.
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opportunities to make cultural claims for resources increased in some regencies and 
provinces, and significantly diminished in others.
The New Public Morality in Indonesia
The growing debate over public morality, often linked to religious groups, has also 
influenced cultural policy. Religious groups in Indonesia have censured behavior 
throughout the twentieth century, and their actions, along with the actions of ethnic 
groups and of state, customary, and cultural organizations, have long been part of the 
milieu in which people have debated the relevant issues and shifted the boundaries of 
acceptable public performance (see, for instance, Harnish on performance in Lombok138 
and Picard on Bali).139 While this configuration has never been uniform and the arts are 
more diverse in decentralized Indonesia than they were under the New Order, two 
changes do indicate a trend towards increased policing of public behavior by religious 
bodies. First, open elections have led to the return of Islamic political parties, the 
members of which have been particularly vocal regarding a perceived national decline 
in morality as state control has relaxed. Second, the reduced presence of the military 
has emboldened Islamic social groups, and members of these groups have intervened 
in the activities of other Indonesians, at times with violence, when they perceived that 
there has been an affront to Islamic teachings.140 Two events of national significance 
illustrate the current influence of public morality debates on cultural practices and 
their potential to influence cultural policy.
While concern over the interventions of Islamic groups, like the Islamic Defenders' 
Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and Laskar Jihad, has an influence on cultural 
activities at the local level across Indonesia, the impact of these groups is most clearly 
demonstrated through the response to an artwork at the inaugural CP Biennale in 
April 2005. The exhibit of paintings, titled Pinkswing Park, by Agus Suwage and Davy 
Linggar, displayed at the Bank Mandiri Museum, was forced to close following public 
statements and an attack by FPI members. Pinkswing Park offered multiple depictions 
of model Isabel Yahya and soap opera star Anjasmara naked among trees, with white 
dots providing cover to protect the sensibilities of modest viewers. Following the 
actions of FPI and the reaction of public figures in the media, the CP Biennale's curator, 
Jim Supangkat, closed the Biennale permanently.141
The second example is anti-pornography legislation that was proposed in 2002 and 
passed, after fierce debate and revision, in 2008. Originally designed to restrict the 
distributors of pornography and the media, the bill was expanded in 2005 to include 
curbs on "porno-action" (porno-aksi), which referred to "pornographic" or erotic dress
138 Harnish, "'Digging' and 'Upgrading.'"
139 Michel Picard, "Cultural Tourism, Nation-Building, and Regional Culture: The Making of a Balinese 
Identity," in Tourism, Ethnicity, and the State in Asian and Pacific Societies, ed. Michel Picard and Robert E. 
Wood (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).
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or behavior in public. Under the draft bill as it stood in late 2005 and early 2006, public 
kissing, "erotic" dancing, and the display of any "sensual" part of the body were 
banned. There were exceptions for (indigenous) cultural performances, sports, and arts 
activities, but these were restricted to sports buildings and arts spaces, which required 
government permits. Early in 2006, the draft anti-pornography legislation sparked 
large protests across Indonesia, and debates raged in the media and parliament over 
the bill. While supporters focused on supposed moral decline and the welfare of 
children, opponents of the bill focused on its effects on women (who were held to be 
responsible for violence against women due to their clothing) and its effects on 
culture.142
The cultural arguments mounted against the bill took two forms. First, opponents 
argued that the legislation imposed Saudi (or Wahabi) culture on Indonesians.143 
Second, they asserted that the bill ignored and threatened Indonesia's multiculturalism 
by attempting to homogenize local cultures. This argument was made by both 
politically liberal groups (generally in major cities) and by conservative cultural 
organizations around Indonesia. In Bali, a number of "Defenders of Tradition" (Penjaga 
Budaya) were appointed to prevent any outsiders from interfering with local 
ceremonies. The most telling and effective move against the bill was carried out in the 
provinces of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Bali, and North Sulawesi,144 where local authorities 
warned that the draft bill was unlikely to pass through the Peoples' Regional 
Representative Council, the national office that represents regional interests. A 
watered-down version of the law, which still included a broad definition of 
pornography that addressed behavior in public performances and nudity, was passed 
in October 2008.145 The governor of Bali quickly stated that the law would not be 
applied in Bali, due to that island's reliance on tourism and its strong cultural lobby.146
Legislation shaped at the national level needs to be considered alongside the many 
laws passed at the regency and city levels that regulate individual behavior in ways 
that can be highly restrictive on local arts and cultural practices perceived as 
incompatible with Islamic laws. Public displays of affection, inappropriate dress, and 
the consumption of alcohol have been regulated in provinces such as Cianjur and 
Garut, West Java. In places where syariah law has been implemented, new legal 
guidelines for behavior have often been justified as both already engrained in local 
customs (adat) and as defining and taking precedence over those customs.147 Such a 
definition of adat has long been held by conservative Islamic groups that seek to 
resolve conflicts between their interpretation of Islam and adat practices in their own
112 Radical Islamic groups like FPI have also lobbied against groups that practice versions of Islam that 
they consider flawed, with some success. These protests have had an impact on the cultural practices of 
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favor.'48In 2008, approximately 160 local religious regulations were made by local 
government in at least 24 of Indonesia's then 33 provinces.I4M Bandung took a different 
route with its religious programs, choosing instead to engage a variety of religions in a 
civic program called "Bandung: Religious City" (Kota Agamis Bandung).
Representatives from Islamic, Catholic, Buddhist, and Hindu organizations produced a 
declaration that called for mutual tolerance and respect, and for the groups to strive 
together to address social and environmental issues. However, a pluralistic approach 
to religion is not necessarily in itself pluralistic for the broader community. The 
"Religious City" program was invoked when the authorities chose to relocate 
prostitutes from the Saritem entertainment district, to ban singer Dewi Persik from 
Bandung, and to pressure local night clubs to close during Ramadan.148 950
Cultural Policy in the Reform Era
Decentralization and democratic elections in Indonesia have not led to a 
widespread, innovative, and inclusive cultural policy. The absence of a strong political 
alliance that could drive far-reaching reform has severely limited the scope of policy 
reform. In this climate, the authoritarian cultural policy model established during the 
New Order remains relevant to Indonesia in the Reform era, although its influence has 
substantially declined due to the fracturing of cultural policy. Its influence is still 
strong in the national cultural bureaucracy, in national policy, and in particular regions 
where there is strong continuity between the Suharto and post-Suharto eras in political 
and policy approaches. However, the process of political decentralization and the 
weakening of the central state have created opportunities for conservative and liberal- 
minded opposition to contest this model. There are some similarities here to the early 
years of the New Order era, during which a number of competing discourses about 
culture and its uses vied for dominance, and regional arts were being revived through 
associations with the state. In contemporary, decentralized Indonesia, however, state 
support is now being provided through new units at the lower levels of government 
associated with specific ethnicities, rather than through a strong central state. Since the 
central state has reduced its control, there are more opportunities for non-elites to use 
culture to influence political and civic decisions, and the approach of the previous, 
Suharto-era government has not been as comprehensively rejected as was the case with 
Sukarno-era cultural policy. The competing approaches to cultural policy are also 
unlikely to be resolved in the same way they were in the 1960s, with the imposition of 
the authoritarian cultural policy model by a strong central government.
A way to understand the current set of influences on the state's cultural policy is to 
examine the competing ways that culture is being used as a tool of governance. This
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article has demonstrated that broadly similar trends are occurring across Indonesia, 
and the examples from West Java indicate that strikingly different trends can exist in 
close proximity to each other, and sometimes in the same municipality. If one 
considers the trends and events of the Reform era, four different uses of culture can be 
identified in policy, although any conclusions drawn at this time are tentative and 
need to be borne out in further research due to the fractured and slow process of policy 
and institutional change in Indonesia.
First, arguments by certain Islamic groups in favor of stricter control over morality 
threaten to cause a closer regulation of cultural activities, and a related rejection of the 
importance of culture as a mechanism for altering the conduct of Indonesians, leading, 
in some cases, to a reduction of state funding for cultural activities, or a redefinition of 
cultural activities as a form of Islamic education. These groups advocate religious 
activities and education as a more appropriate tool than culture for the enlightenment 
and development of the nation. Second, liberal understandings of the role of culture 
continue to be evident in cultural policies (for both indigenous and contemporary 
culture) that utilize culture for progressive social change, and in the arguments for the 
creation of a tolerant multiculturalism and cultural activities. In this approach, the 
state's role is to facilitate and protect contemporary and indigenous cultural practices 
that contribute to a tolerant and creative multicultural society. Third, conservative 
indigenous elements are making use of local ethnic sentiment for either their own 
political goals and/or to strengthen a conservative version of local indigenous culture. 
A conservative approach to regional culture also argues for state protection of 
multiculturalism, although those who advocate such an approach generally aim to 
protect particular indigenous practices linked to a local ethnic constituency. Finally, the 
authoritarian cultural policy model has survived and continues to focus on national 
economic development. Cultural policy continues to be justified as a tool of social and 
economic development and as a way to offset the effects of development. The 
consequences of the increasing emphasis on wealth generation again appear to 
threaten and affect regional artists most seriously. Their priorities receive little 
attention in the copyright legislation, and the state has allowed, or even encouraged, 
continued heavy-handed intervention in their activities.
Cultural policy in the Reformasi era is influenced by the ongoing presence of the 
authoritarian cultural policy model among a bureaucratic elite with close ties to 
cultural academics that privileges national culture and national development, and 
liberal and conservative groups' advocacy of local cultural rights. In some locations, 
the existence of cultural policy is under threat, along with the legitimacy of cultural 
difference, with Islamic political groups rejecting the use of culture as a tool of 
governance altogether. In most localities, there is a trend towards more opportunities 
in cultural policy for tradition and locality to contest nation and modernity, from 
conservative and progressive positions. Cultural policy outcomes at the local level vary 
and protection of cultural diversity is far from enshrined; what the state has enshrined 
is a diversity of cultural policy.
